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Abstract
In 2015 the federal government announced the largest data breach in United States
government history. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was hacked, and the personal
information of more than 25 million American people was lost to foreign attackers. This incident
has spawned concern and outrage about the security of government data in the emerging digital
age .
Moving forward from the breach questions remain about how this event happened. It' s
clear that there were weaknesses that were taken advantage of by malicious threats abroad, and
investigations into the attack have yielded surprising results. Not only was the security in place at
OPM insufficient, this fact had been known for years leading up to the breach. Along with the
agency, third-party contractors working with the agency and the federal government contributed
to the weak security controls that allowed this calamity to occur.
With cyber security moving to the forefront of the American public's mind , it is
important to understand what has been done to shore up the defenses in place to protect federal
data since the attack, and what can be done in the future to prevent attacks like this to from being
successful in the future. Cybersecurity will be increasingly important for the government to
address as hackers and other militant groups gain access to better hacking technology.

11

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the support and help of my two mentors, John Ferguson and
Shannon Peterson. They have been instrumental not only in my undergraduate experience as a
whole, but also in the process of writing this essay. They both have encouraged and challenged
me to become a better student and person.

I would also like to acknowledge and thank Michael Kennedy of VMware for giving me
to the opportunity to intern in the VMware Government Relations office. This internship was my
spark for taking an interest in cybersecurity and the OPM data breach in particular.

111

Final Written Product- 7,073 words
As the world progresses into the digital age, more and more information is being moved
online. The security of secret files and documents has changed from locked doors and filing
cabinets to complex cyber security that most people don' t understand. The threat to the privacy
of government data may be more real now than ever before as hackers are able to access remote
information from the safety of unknown locations all across the world. These hackers are
becoming more sophisticated, and people are reminded of the dangers they pose by their
successful attempts to steal private data. Perhaps the most forceful reminder of recent times was
the announcement by the United States government of the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) data breach. This data breach was the first major breach of a government system. While
there have been multiple private sector breaches involving millions of people, this was the first to
challenge the federal government. There are still many questions and fears about the implications
of the data breach involving federal data. In order to better understand the threats to sensitive
federal data, it is important to understand what occurred in the OPM data breach, what enable the
breach to take place, and what can be done to prevent such breaches in the future.
Although cyber crime is becoming more commonplace everyday, the jargon that
accompanies this type of crime is often difficult to understand. In order to better understand the
following account of the OPM data breach, it is important to identify some common
technological meanings. In cybersecurity when a malicious attempt is made to access a computer
network, it is known as an attack. If the attack is successful in penetrating the network defenses,
it becomes known as an intrusion. In an intrusion, the hacker has access to information within the
network, but hasn ' t modified or removed any information. If the attacker is able to modify

information or remove it from the network, the intrusion becomes known as a breach. The role of
cybersecur ity is to identify and stop these attacks as soon as possible.

Literature Review
Cybersecur ity has become an increasingly important research topic over the past ten
years as more organizatio ns move their information into digital format. As more information
moves online, securing data becomes a major concern. Many researchers insist that IT security is
underfunde d, and that this underfundi ng will lead to problems down the road if action isn' t taken
to secure data systems. 1 Forethough t will be required of organizational leaders in order to defend
their secure information from prying eyes.
One of the issues with cybersecurity is that it is so difficult to understand . Because
managers and investors aren ' t able to understand the highly technical language of cybersecurity,
it is difficult to prioritize installment and maintenance of secure systems. 2 Those that understand
securing their private data will be those that are successful in the future .
As security is installed, many managers make the mistake of assuming that all hacking
attempts can be deterred by a strong enough security system. Layers of security were
incorporate d into data systems, each building on the other. Now research points to that fact that
no matter the number of layers, data systems will experience breaches. The focus must turn to
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North, James, and Richard Pascoe. 2016. 11 Cyber security and resilience -- it's all about
Dobrian, Joseph. 2015. 11 Are You Sitting on a Cyber Security Bombshell ?. 11 Journal Of Property
Manageme nt 80, no. 5: 8-11. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhos t(accessed May 5, 2016).
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mitigation and elimination of malicious traffic on organization systems. 3 This is a crucial turning
point for cybersecurity as a practice.
Many researchers have tried to assess the results of data breaches. There are attempts to
analyze the results in order to help IT officials and managers decide how to allocate funds to
cybersecurity. Researchers such as Ginger Davis, Alfredo Garcia, and Weide Zhang try to
quantify the costs of breaches in order to use a mathematical approach to resource allocation in
IT budgets. 4
The 2015 data breach of the US Governme nt Office of Personnel Manageme nt
(OPM) highlights the importance of this research. This project will attempt to shed light
on the nature of the OPM data breach and will assess to what extent the challenges
identified in the literature are relevant to the understanding of the OPM problem and its
potential solution.

Research Method ology
Much of the research builds upon the internship completed by the author with VMware
during the summer of 2015. VMware is an information technology company that aims to help
data systems create better security controls. This knowledge provided a factual background for
the capstone project and informed much of the discussion of the research.
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Densham, Ben. "Three Cyber-security Strategies to Mitigate the Impact of a Data Breach."
Network Security 2015, no. l (January 27, 2015): 5-8 . doi: l 0.1016/s l 353-4858(15)70007-3.
4
Davis, Ginger, Alfredo Garcia, and Weide Zhang. 2009. "Empirical Analysis of the Effects of
Cyber Security Incidents." Risk Analysis: An International Journal 29, no. 9: 13041316.SPORTDiscus with Full Text, EBSCOhos t (accessed May 5, 2016).
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Due to the relative dearth of scholarly articles on the OPM data breach, the data for this
research comes primarily from individual testimonies before congressional hearings in both the
Senate and the House in the summer of 2015. The House Committee of Oversight and
Government Reform along with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government held hearings on the
OPM data breach. Transcripts of the numerous hearings about the breach provide insight from
experts closest to the federal investigation that took place into the event. Along with verbal
testimony, experts' submitted written testimony expounds upon some of the more technological
issues surrounding this particular breach.

The Series of OPM Data Breaches
In June of 2015 the public learned that OPM had suffered one of the most severe
breaches of government data in history . Reports stated that hackers had infiltrated the OPM
network and taken the personal information of millions of current and former employees.
Although initial estimates put the number of affected persons at 4-5 million that number
continued to grow until it reached more than 21 million current and former employees as well as
applicants for federal positions. The information taken ranged from social security numbers and
addresses to intimate background checks and fingerprints. The security of confidential federal
question came severely under question .
As more details began to come to light, government agency officials were called to testify
before Congress. A tenuous timeline of events began to unfold that made it clear that the OPM
data breach was much more than a one-time successful attack on a government agency. The
OPM data breach was in fact a series of data intrusions and breaches dating back at least two

4

years. The timeline of events that fall under the umbrella of the OPM data breach is given below
in chronolog ical order of discovery date. Understa nding the series of events and how they are
connected is a crucial part of understan ding how to secure federal data in the future.

The First OPM Data Breach
The first chronolog ically relevant incident to the OPM breach is an intrusion detected in
March of 2014. This intrusion was detected as result of interagen cy cooperati on between DHS
and OPM. DHS is responsib le for assisting agencies that suffer successfu l cyber attacks.
Investigation into the intrusion revealed foreign activity on the OPM network as far back as
Novembe r 2013. 5 During this time, the hackers did not have full access to the OPM network, but
they did have access to some documen ts. Among those documen ts were manuals about the OPM
systems. These manuals were taken at this time.
In a hearing before the House Committe e on Oversigh t and Governm ent Reform, Ms .
Donna Seymour , Chief informati on Officer (CIO) of OPM, described the manuals taken as
" [m]anuals about the servers and the environm ent." When pressed if these manuals could serve
as a blueprint for the OPM network, she responded , " It would be fair to say that they would give
you enough informati on that you could learn about the platform, the infrastruc ture of our
system." 6 It is not known how much of a role the informati on acquired in this first breach played
in further attacks on the OPM system.

It is importan t to understan d that OPM employs several third-part y contracto rs to assist
with backgrou nd checks and other agency operations. Due to their involvem ent with OPM, these
contractors have access to the agency systems. Two contracto rs in particular , USIS and Keypoint
5

htt s://fc w.com/ articles/2_QJ5/08/2 l/opm-breach-ti meline.as Jx?m= l
OPM: Data Breach: Hearing Before the Committe e on Oversigh t and Governm ent Reform,
United States House of Represen tatives, 114th Cong. (2015).
6
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Government Solutions, are of particular interest to the OPM data breach because malicious
activity and breaches were discovered on their networks after the initial OPM breach. 7
The USIS Data Breach
The first breach of third-party systems detected was in USIS systems. USIS notified their
contracting agency, OPM, of a breach of data on the USIS network. This breach was later
discovered to date back as far as April 2013. 8 At this time some personally identifiable
info1mation (PII) was removed from the contracting company's system. At 2,600 individuals ' PII
was taken in this breach. USIS was not only a contractor with OPM, but they contracted with
DHS as well. Hackers in this breach extracted no DHS information.
USIS notified OPM and acknowledged the breach of its system in August 2014. This
breach of USIS systems was initially considered to be a separate incident, but was later ruled to
be in connection with the earlier OPM breach. OP suspended work with USIS in August, and
contracts with USIS were not renewed after their expiration. 9

The Keypoint Data Breaches
As part of the response after OPM was notified of the USIS breach, officials from the
U.S. Computer Readiness Team scanned the networks of both Keypoint and USIS. These scans
revealed two distinct breaches in the Keypoint systems. 10

7
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Under Attack: Federal Cybersecurity and the OPM Data Breach: Hearing Before the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 114th Cong.
(2015).
8
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Sternstein, Aliya, and Jack Moore. "Timeline: What We Know About the OPM Breach."
Nextgov. June 17, 2015. Accessed May 05, 2016 .
http://www.nextgov .corn/cybersecurity/2015/06/timeline-what-we-know-about-opmbreach/115603/.
10
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6

During the first Keypoint breach, hackers gained access to more that 400,000 federal
employee s' and contracto rs ' PII. Investigators claim there is no conclusiv e evidence that the PII
was actually removed from Keypoint servers at this time, and the public was not notified until
June 2015. It is further believed that the attackers gained access to Keypoint systems some time
in Decembe r 2013 . 11 This gives the hackers ample time to navigate througho ut the Keypoint
system.
A second Keypoint breach took place seemingl y concurren tly with the first, but
investigators insist that the two series of malicious activity are separate attacks. Similarly to the
first discovered OPM breach, the hackers removed data from Keypoint that could assist in future
attacks against OPM networks . This time the hackers were able to secure a set of employee
credentials from the Keypoint network. These credentials provided access to the OPM system
and were later acknowle dged by OPM Director Katherine Archuleta to have been used in future
OPM breaches. 12 Ms . Archuleta commend ed Keypoint for their cooperati on with federal security
investigators and assured the Senate Homelan d Security and Governm ent Affairs Committe e that
Keypoint had implemen ted all suggested remediati on efforts. Keypoint is continues contractual
relations with the federal governme nt through OPM. 13

The Second OPM Data Breaches
The previous four breaches of OPM data excited relatively little governme ntal or public
concern over the security of federal data. The real panic began in April of 2015 with the
discovery of the two largest data breaches. As OPM was updating security across its networks, a
11
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(2015).
13
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foreign presence was detected within the systems. Upon discovery of this intrusion, DHS worked
with OPM to perform an in depth scan of networks housing OPM data and discovered another
breach in the Departme nt of Interior (DOI) data center. 14
Although the DOI breach was discovered after the second OPM breach, details about the
DOI breach came forth more quickly. DOI was storing OPM records in their data center, and
diagnostic revealed with a "high confidence" that 4.2 million records had been removed by
hackers. Just as in previous breaches, this information was comprised of information about
employees past and present as well as applicants for government positions. Investigators
determined that hackers successfully gained access to the DOI network in October of2014. 15
Results of investigations into the OPM data breach that led to the DOI breach discovery
yielded even worse results . Just months after the first OPM breach was detected and expelled
from the system, hackers gained access to OPM servers once again. This activity began in May
2014 and continued for more than a year until the April 2015 discovery. Experts claim that
security updates on the OPM network incapacitated the breach in January 2015, but detection of
the foreign activity didn't take place until further security updates in April. Hackers were most
active within the network between June 2014 and January 2015 when new security disabled their
ability to access further data. 16
The second OPM data breach was by far the largest and most concerning. Investigations
revealed that any persons that had a federal background check from 2000 until the time the
breach was stopped are "highly likely" to have been impacted by the event. The OPM website
records some of the final tallies for the breach: 21.5 million social security numbers, 5.6 million

14
15
16
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sets of fingerprints, and usernames and passwords used by government applicants to complete
employment forms. 17 A senate hearing further revealed that among the information obtained by
the hackers were SF-86 forms. This personnel form requires intimate details about applicants and
employees such as mental health history, past employment, social security number, previous
residences, and details about family members. 18 Forms like the SF-86 led to the PII of 1.8
million nonapplicants being taken in the breach along with the other data. OPM claims that there
is no proof that health financial , and payroll records were obtained in the breach. 19

The Aftermath
In response to the series of breaches, notifications to affected persons have been sent out
intermittently. The final round of notifications began September 30, 2015 and was scheduled to
continue for 12 weeks. OPM has called the Interior breach "the incident involving personnel
data" and the April 2015 OPM breach "the background investigation incident." 20 The agency is
providing full service identity restoration and identity theft insurance to victims of either
incident, but also continuous identity and credit monitoring for those affected by the background
investigation incident.21

17

"Cybersecurity Resource Center Cybersecurity Incidents." U.S. Office of Personnel
Management. Accessed May 05, 2016. https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurityincidents/#WhatHappened.
18
Under Attack: Federal Cybersecurity and the OPM Data Breach: Hearing Before the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 114th Cong.
(2015).
19
"Cybersecurity Resource Center Cybersecurity Incidents." U.S. Office of Personnel
Management. Accessed May 05, 2016 . https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurityincidents/#WhatHappened.
20
ibid
21
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Although there were numerous reports that the hackers behind the OPM data breach were
located
in China, there has been no formal accusation made. 22 In December the Washington Post
reported that the Chinese government had arrested individuals connected to the OPM data
breach, but some U.S. governm ent officials were reluctant to admit that these were the
actual
hackers. The Chinese governm ent has insisted that it did not play a role in the attacks. 23
Not knowing the identity of the hackers makes it difficult to guess what the motive was
in
attacking OPM systems. There are concerns that the hackers may be able to compile a
database
of government employees in an attempt to target high level officials or some other form
of
espionage. Experts revealed in a Senate hearing that the hackers had the ability to modify
employee background records including security clearance adjudication or derogatory
comments.
This is seen as highly unlikely, but the threat remains that there may have been tamperin
g on the
network. 24 There is any number of possible uses for the data that was removed from OPM
and
for attacking the agency' s database. It remains to be seen what may result from this breach.

Organ izatio nal Secur ity Failur es
As investigations released more information on the series of breaches and they were
slowly fit into a coherent timeline, it became obvious that there were numerous weaknes
s and

22

Barrett, Devlin, Danny Yadron, and Damian Paletta. "The Big Story Behind China's New
Military Strategy - Congres sman J. Randy Forbes." States News Service, June 5, 2015.
Accessed
2016. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1 G 1-416623199 .html ?refid=easy hf.
23
Nakashima, Ellen. "Chinese Government Has Arrested Hackers It Says Breached OPM
Database." Washington Post. Decemb er 2, 2015. Accessed May 05, 2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-government-has-arreste
dhackers-suspected-of-breaching-opm-database/2015/12/02/0295b918-990c-l 1e5-8917653b65c809eb_story .html.
24
Under Attack: Federal Cybersecurity and the OPM Data Breach: Hearing Before the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 114th
Cong.
(2015).

failures in the OPM security network. It is nearly impossible to entirely guarantee perfect
security on any network, so organizations focus on two levels of security . The first level
is
prevention. They implem ent tools such as passwords and firewalls to keep threats from
being
able to access secure networks. The second level is timely identification of threats that
do access
the servers before they can remove or modify data on the servers. It can be seen from details
of
the OPM data breach that both the security of OPM servers and third-party contractors
was
insufficient and afforded attackers the opportunity to breach the system.

Third-Party Contractors
Prior to news breaking of the two largest OPM breaches, a hearing was held before the
House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform about enhanci
ng the
cybersecurity of third party contractors and vendors. This hearing took place in late April
of
2015, and specifically addressed many of the issues surrounding the breaches of Keypoin
t and
USIS networks containing sensitive government data.
During the course of statements and testimony it became clear there were significant
weaknes ses in the infrastructure of security systems between contractors and agencies
such as
inconsistent notification procedure, ineffective contractual language, and poor network
architecture. Contractors comprise a large component of federal security, as nearly one
third of
security personnel working across 24 agencies are contracted employees. Experts at the
House
Committee Hearing testified of three main weaknesses in the structure of contracting compan
ies'
security in relation to agency networks.

25
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The first concern with contractor security was an inconsistent application of notification
procedure for malicious activity. At the time agencies were not utilizing a standard set of
procedures for when contractors must report malicious activity on their networks. Furthermore,
when the contractors did report the activity, it was not to a uniform body . Information about
rebuffed attacks and successful intrusions were not being reported to higher levels of federal
security. This lack of information sharing allowed attackers to attempt intrusions into multiple
systems with each system working to independently identify the threat. If threats are reported to
higher agencies, information regarding attacks on other systems can be used to thwart the same
attackers' attempts on new systems.

26

This information sharing is similar to law enforcement sharing information about
criminals in the physical world. Because cyber criminals are rarely apprehended, they are still
able to attempt further attacks on different systems. If one agency reports to the others that there
is a group of criminals driving a black van with license plate #112233, then other agencies are
able to adjust their security to watch for the identified threat. This same principle works in
cybersecurity. If one group can identify a threat and report it to other organizations and agencies,
then they can adjust their systems to watch for similar threats.
With greater information sharing, the federal government could compile an inclusive list
of known threats and attackers that all contractors and agencies would be able to utilize in
securing their networks.
The second concern was that contractual language did not permit agencies to inspect and
modify contractors ' security systems. Many of the contractors were not in compliance with
federal cybersecurity regulation, but agencies lacked the ability to inspect and modify security

26
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practices in use by the contractors. Different agencies will have different security needs, so it is
not abnormal for contractors to implemen t different types of data security. Agencies, however,
should be able to assess contracto rs' security systems to confirm that they will be adequate for
their purpose. 27
The third concern with contractor relationships with agencies was network infrastructure.
There were a variety of approaches to how agencies built contractors into their networks. Some
agencies allowed contractors nearly full access to their networks. This means that contractors
were able to use laptops to connect directly into the agency network. Other agencies required
their contractors to connect laptops to the company network before allowing access to the agency
network. The latter construct ion provides another level of security for data contained in the
networks. It is apparent that there was not standard for network architecture between contractors
and agencies, and this is an exploitable weakness for hackers .28
The credential that was removed from Keypoint in their second breach demonstrates at
least in part the issues with network architecture. This credential allowed full access to the OPM
network. Security measures were not able to detect the hostile presence because the credential
gave the hackers the ability to move freely through the system with authorization and
clearance. 29 It was not until unusual activity was detected in connectio n that security
administrators were able to realize that the credential was compromised. Better architecture can
help to prevent lower level credentials from having significant access to secure systems.
Mr. Tony Scott, the United State Chief Information Officer, took the lead at the hearing
in reporting on the measures that have been taken to improve the security of third party

27
28
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contractors working with government data. In response to the first concern about inconsistent
security reporting, 0MB has led an effort to assemble and disseminate a set of best practices to
agencies to help with efforts to strengthen federal security. These best practices should help to
alleviate the stress the inconsistent responses and protocols currently place on security efforts for
the federal network as a whole.
Along with the effort of O MB to create a set of best practices for third party contractors,
the agency has worked with the Federal CIO Council and the CAO Council to create
recommendations for bolstering cybersecurity language in Federal contracts including three
specific recommendations. First, formal guidance to implement new policy requirements.
Second, updates to existing guidance or recommend inclusions in annual guidance documents .
Third, facilitation of best practices sharing through existing interagency forums. With these
formal recommendations in place and distributed to agencies, it is hoped that contractual
language will require agencies to allow greater agency control in emergency or breach situations.
This should also help the agencies inspect and modify contractor security measures if there are
concerns that the security is insufficient.
In response to poor network infrastructure between agencies and contractors, 0MB has
worked with the CIO Council as well as the Office of Federal Procurement Policy in order to
share information about contracting clauses. This has helped to develop clauses for federal
contracts with vendors that strengthen the federal government's position and ability to monitor
contractors' network architecture. These clauses will provide a framework for how network
architecture should be constructed between agencies and third parties.
As these concerns are addressed, it will help to improve the security of federal data, but it
will not make it invincible. As it is clear that there is no cybersecurity silver bullet, a measure
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that can prevent all malicious attacks, most of the measures taken are to help the federal
government react to incidents with contractors. Contractors will still need to implemen t strong
security measures, but these new policies will help the federal governme nt more effectively
control overall security of its data. It is clear that third party weakness es played a role in some of
the OPM breaches, but not all. This means that the federal systems themselv es must be
scrutinized in order to understand the weaknesses that are contained within their networks .

OPM
While there are many that blame the OPM data breach on the comprom ised credential
taken from a third-party contractor, it is obvious from the timeline that this was not the only
weakness exploited in the OPM data breach. OPM's own network was breached at least two
times, and at least once before the credential was successfully acquired. The agency had been
warned of substantial security weaknesses over years leading up to the incidents, and those
weaknesses were eventually exploited to gain access to the network.
Under the Federal Information Securities Act (FISMA), the Office of Inspector General
(OIG) is required to audit agency information technology (IT) security. Annual reports detail the
chronology of deficiencies in OPM security systems as far back as FY2007. In that year OIG
found and reported material weakness es "related to the lack of security policies and procedures."
These weaknesses were annually reported as a concern up to FY2014.
From the annual reports it is clear that deficiencies were present in the OPM security
systems for years prior to the breach. Dating back to FY2007 OIG found material weakness es
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"related to the lack of IT security policies and procedures." These types of deficiencies continued
to plague the agency even up to FY 2014. 30

It should come as no surprise that as the agency was not enforcing a standard set of protocol for
its contractors, it was also failing to implemen t a coherent set of security protocol and measures
within its own systems.
In written testimony, Assistant Inspector General Michael R. Esser from the IOG of OPM
discussed three key issues with OPM's IT security. The first weakness identified was
information security governance, which is the managem ent structure and foundation of an IT
security program. Until FY 2012 OPM was using a decentralized governing structure for its IT
security. This decentralization is one the factors that led to there being OPM data held
throughout thousands of different data centers including DOI. Decentralization was considered a
material weakness until FY 2014 when it was upgraded to a "significant weakness " due to the
efforts of the agency to centralize control. Although it is clear that the agency was progressing
toward a better security environm ent, years of decentralized and poorly monitore d security
systems contributed to the weakness es in the system.31
The second area of concern according to Esser was security assessme nt and
authorization. Security assessme nt and authorization ensures that all IT systems meet a specified
security standard before being allowed to operate in an agency 's technical environment. Again
OPM had a history of poor performa nce in this area. Audits detected a weakness in OPM
30

Esser, Michael. Statemen t to the House, Committee on Oversight and Governm ent Reform.
OPM: Data Breach, Hearing, June 16, 2015. Available at: https://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/Esser-OPM-OIG-Statement-6-16-Data-Breach. pdf.
31
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authorization dating back to FY 2010. Although the concern was alleviated enough to be
dropped from audit FY 2012, the issue had resumed by FY 2014. In FY 2014, 11 out of 47
systems were operating without assessment and authorization. More concerning is the fact that
each of those 11 systems were supposed to undergo reassessment in FY 2014 but did not.
Experts claim that some of these systems operating without authorization were some of the most
critical systems in operation . This constitutes one of the most significant weaknesses in the OPM

. networ k .32
secunty
The third and final area of concern was technical security controls. This broad area
revealed a host of deficiencies in the agency systems. The most concerning issue the agency was
facing was the lack of a comprehensive list of all databases and servers that exist within the
OPM network. It is impossible to secure assets that the agency doesn't even know to exist. This
issue relates to the lack of centralization of security in the agency , and presents a terrible
weakness that could be exploited .33
Along with the lack of a comprehensive list of assets operating on the OPM network,
many of the controls in place to protect the OPM network were not properly functioning. The
agency was performing vulnerability scans on its known computers and assets, but many
computers were never scanned. Other scans that did take place were not properly executed due to
a lack of proper credentials. In fact, many of the agency's tools were not functioning to their
fullest capability. 34
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Along with these perennial concerns, other system deficiencies were identified and
reported during congressional hearings. Data encryption is an industry best practice for securing
data, but it came to light during testimony that much, if not all, the data that was removed from
OPM systems was entirely unencrypted. When pressured about why this basic security feature
was not in use for all data in OPM systems, Director Archuleta responded that many of the
systems in use at OPM are legacy systems, systems that are out of date. Because these systems
are older it can be difficult if not impossible to utilize encryption on data in these systems. This
has been a known problem in government agencies for years, but the rate of technological
growth and the increasing cost of technology equipment make it difficult for agencies to keep up
with the industry .35

It would be unfair to assume that OPM was not trying to address its numerous security
issues. OPM is continuing to work on the process of centralizing their assets in an effort to better
protect them. They have also attempted to instill a protocol for addressing security incidents and
incident management. They have had to concentrate on securing their most crucial networks first
before they can move on to the rest of their networks. This process is well under way according
to witnesses at congressional hearings.36
OPM has been working closely with DHS in order to bolster their security controls. The
federal government has used DHS to help distribute security systems that will monitor and
protect agency networks . As these tools are implemented and correctly used, this will help to
remedy the failures OPM was experiencing with scanning and monitoring their networks.

35

37

Under Attack: Federal Cybersecurity and the OPM Data Breach: Hearing Before the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, I 14th Cong.

(20 I 5).
36
37

ibid
ibid
18

Encryption and legacy computers continue to be an interesting topic of debate. It is clear
in this situation that encryption would not have protected the data because the hackers were
moving through the network with an authorized credential. 38 It is a concern that this information
was not encrypted in the first place. OPM will need to be more aggressive with its replacemen t
and improveme nt of out of date technology. This is one of the reasons OPM has requested an
addition 21 million dollars for FY2016 in order to complete a data modernizat ion project it
started in 2014. 39 This will help to update OPM systems and hopefully bring them at least to the
point they can be encrypted.

The Federal Governm ent
Along with the failures of the contractors and agency, there is some blame to be placed
on overall federal security measures in place. The federal governmen t has established four roles
for DHS in federal cybersecurity. The first role is to provide a common set of security
capabilities as a baseline defense for federal agencies . This is done in the form of two programs,
EINSTEIN and Continual Diagnostic s and Monitoring (CDM) . Second, they motivate agencies
to implement security best practices and measure how well each agency does this. Third, DHS
serves as an information hub for information sharing. Fourth, DHS provides incident response to
agencies or contractors that suffer and incident or intrusion.40
In accordance with the first task, DHS develops and deploys EINSTEIN for agency
implementation. EINSTEIN is a perimeter defense focused on identifying threats before they
38
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enter the system. There are currently three iterations of the EINSTEIN program, and each is in
different stages of deployment.
EINSTEIN 1, the first iteration, is capable of monitoring network traffic as it operates on
the system. It also has the capability of identifying inconsistencies or anomalies in the traffic
within the network. The second iteration, EINSTEIN 2, created the ability to detect known
malicious activity as it enters the network and sounds an alarm. This does not stop the malicious
threat from entering, but it will create an alert to let officials know the threat is present. These
versions of EINSTEIN were in place when the breach happened. 41
Dr. Ozment uses a description of a physical federal facility to help describe the function
of these programs. EINSTEIN 1 is similar to camera at the entrance of the facility. It records all
traffic on the road and can identify anomalies in traffic patterns. EINSTEIN 2 adds the ability of
using a watch list to identify suspicious cars among the other traffic . It cannot stop suspicious
vehicles, but it can create an alert that will notify security officials of the suspicious vehicle. 42
EINSTEIN 3A is the newest iteration of this system. EINSTEIN 3A has the capability to
not only monitor traffic in the network, but also to prohibit known malicious traffic from
entering. This new phase uses classified as well as unclassified information to screen network
traffic. Previous versions were incapable of accessing classified information. This new iteration
is already working in 15 different agencies that covers about 45% of civilian government.
Although this technology was not available to OPM at the time of the breach, it was scheduled to
be available by the end of FY 2016.
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Returning to Ozment' s analogy with the government facility , EINSTEIN 3A would be
similar to a guard post. It compares all vehicles against a classified watch list and prevents
entrance if the vehicle matches a description from the watch list. This is the first version that
actively stops known malicious traffic from enter the networks. 43

It is obvious that because EINSTEIN is a perimeter only defense, that it is necessary to
provide another layer of defense. DHS has created Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation
(CDM) program to complemen t EINSTEIN . Where EINSTEIN is a perimeter defense, CDM
helps to monitor inside the network. In its first phase, CDM is focused on endpoint integrity. In
phases 2 and 3, will eventually include identity and infrastructure management. 44
Agencies are able to improve their diagnostic capabilities through the tools provided by
CDM. These tools allow the agencies to increase their network sensor capacity and allowing
them to prioritize potential threats and weaknesses. The process has six steps. The first step is for
agencies to install sensors within their network. Once the sensors are installed, they can be used
to scan for known cyber flaws . The information from the scans is then syphoned into a bank with
the results from scans of other agencies and departments. Reports are compiled utilizing a
prioritized list of issues for each specific agency. The agency is then capable of assessing and
addressing each known weakness with available resources. This helps allocate resources more
efficiently. The final step is for the agency to report back on the results of their progress in
correcting security problems, promoting situational awareness throughout the entire federal
government. 45
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To return to the analogy one last time, CDM Phase 1 allows agencies to continu
ously
monitor door locks and security cameras to make sure they are operating correct
ly. Planned
future versions, Phase 2 and 3, will monitor employees to make sure they are
not engaged in
unusual or malicious activity and monitor activity across the entire facility to
detect any unusual
patterns. 46
At the time of the congressional hearing on the OPM data breach , CDM was
available for
eight government agencies comprising approximately 50 percent of the federal
government. It
was the goal then to cover 97% of federal agencies at the time, and the end of
FY 2015 had
successfully met that goal. The new goal for DHS is to provide 100% CDM
coverage by the end
of FY 2016. 47
Even with these two programs in place, it is necessary for the agencies to supplem
ent
these measures with further layers of security that are customized to their needs.
These are just
the basic levels provided by DHS. It is clear that the programs are progressing
in development
and deployment, but not having these systems in place and the time it takes
to further
development will always be a weakne ss for federal security concerns.

Preventing Future Breaches
The information provide d so far regarding the OPM data breach and the weakne
sses in
government cybersecurity paint a grim picture. There is no single program that
can defend
against all attacks, so agencies must rely on multiple layers of protection and
security to try to
prevent as many intrusions as possible. Many security programs are have simply
accepted that
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intrusions will happen and focus more on removin g intruders as quickly as possible from
the
system. The truth is that it will likely only get worse.
Attacks on data systems containi ng federal informa tion have steadily increase d over the
past decade. From 2013-20 14, attacks on federal information increased 10-15%. This
is coupled
with the fact that experts estimate that the number of attacks overall has increase d more
than
1000% percent over the last 9 years and will continue to increase in coming years. These
attacks
will continue to test adjustments that are made in an attempt to make data more secure. 48
It is true these estimate s must be tempere d by technological factors. Increased convers
ion

from paper to electronic docume nts means that there are more data systems to suffer attacks,
and
more information online that can be accessed . Another factor is that detectio n and identific
ation
systems have steadily increased meaning more attacks are being counted in the overall
numbers .
Attacks that had previously gone unidentified and therefore uncount ed are now detected
by
stronger security systems. Even taking these into account, it the number of attacks is still
rising
as the technolo gy to facilitate hacking attempts become s more widespread. 49
It seems that cybersec urity has become a race to employ new defenses more quickly
than

attackers can develop new ways of attacking. This race is highly depende nt on funding
and may
hinge upon which group will devote the most resources . If the United States is not will
to heavily
invest in IT security, attackers will eventua lly find more ways to gain access to sensitive
information.
Chronic underfu nding has been blamed for many of the security deficien cies governm
ent
agencies are facing even though the federal governm ent spends approxim ately $82 billion
each
48
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year on IT.

50

Witnesses in a hearing before the Senate Appropriat ions Subcommi ttee on

Financial Services and General Governmen t stated that underfundi ng began in the 1990s, and it
was that underfundi ng that led to many of the problems OPM and other agencies are facing
today. One example of this is the decentraliz ed data centers. Experts claim there are thousands of
these centers all across federal networks. This type of architecture is difficult to secure because
data centers are constantly being found outside the security net. 51 The federal governmen t must
take steps to ensure that it is devoting enough resources to evolve with the fast growing trends of
technology.
Even when funds are devoted to IT, acquisition s within the federal governmen t are often
too slow to provide timely assistance. The DHS CDM program took more than two years to
accomplish Phase 1. 52 This is a long time to leave agencies waiting for support in defending their
systems. The same problems persist in updating older equipment and servers. These purchases
are often too little too late, and the governmen t never gets ahead of attackers.
Devoting resources to cybersecur ity is often difficult for lawmakers to do. Because most
people do not understand the technical language of cybersecur ity, they are not willing to impart
the necessary funds to ensure it is effective. It is easy for people to see the needs of soldiers
serving in Iraq or Afghanista n. Anyone can understand why he or she would need an armor
plated vehicle or bulletproof vest, but it is a different story when agencies ask for more money
for segmentati on or multi-facto red authenticat ion.

If the federal governmen t truly wants to make cybersecur ity a priority as it has claimed, it
is going to have to implement a more aggressive strategy . This means not only devoting more
50
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resources to IT, but also drafting new legislation that fast tracks implementation of new security
programs and technology updates. The Whitehouse budget for FY201 7 would suggest that IT
experts have been heard as they continue to beg for more money. The budget that will be
submitted to Congress contains a 35% increase from the budget approved last year. 53 This is a
step in the right direction toward securing America' s government network.
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Reflective Writing- 924 words
Completing this capstone project has been a culmination to my undergraduate experience.
It has been a microcosm of nearly all the experiences I have had throughout my time at

Utah State. There have been frustrations along with successes, and in the end, I am happy
to have completed this project.
For future honors students intending to complete this process, I would suggest
getting an earlier start on the project. I began the project in my final semester, and as a
result, much of the experience was blanketed will the stress of looming deadlines rather
than a holistic and pleasant experience. I imagine there will always be a fair it of stress in
completing a chore such as this.
Particularly planning a time to present my project became an issue as I was trying
to visit potential graduate schools. For any students that are trying to make the jump
directly into graduate school, this can compound the stress of trying to complete the
capstone requirements. It would have been better to either have been further along in the
process or even finished while I was trying to make important decisions about my future.
Another benefit to starting the project earlier is that students will be able to
address topics that they truly wish to address. Rather than being bound by time
restrictions and an internship, students ought to put themselves in a situation to freely
choose a subject in which they want to gain some further expertise. It can be laborious to
research a topic that does not compel or emotionally charge a project.
Having a meaningful internship helped to ease the process of making the decision
what to research for my capstone project. My time in Washington D.C. with VMware
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was structured around much of the material that was discussed in my project, and I had a
solid foundation of knowledge to build on moving forward. This may not always be the
case for students completing internships, but obviously it is important to carefully select
an internship on which to base a final project.
I decided to continue researching the OPM data breach not only because I worked
on it during my internship, but also because of the lack of general knowledge that my
friends and associates seem to have about the event. When I referenced the OPM breach,
I was often questioned as to what it even was. I think it is important for citizens to be
aware of such monumental incidents that happen and affect so many Americans.
Along with my concern for the lack of knowledge about the incident, I personally
was a victim of the OPM data breach. My information was taken during the breach of
Department oflnterior. I worked for the Forest Service as an eighteen-year-old fighting
wild land fires , and because my information was in the federal system, it was at risk
during the breach. As a result, I have identity theft insurance through the government, but
I was curious exactly how my information was taken when I have not worked for the
government in nearly seven years. I am sure there are others that feel the same way that I
do, confused and unnerved at the situation
There was an initial struggle with this project due to the lack of relevant scholarly
articles. It made the process of tracking down information about the data breach
particularly challenging. Along with the lack of scholarly material, much of the detailed
information about the OPM data breach is confidential. This added an extra element of
difficulty in presenting the material readers would need in order to gain a complete full
understanding out the event.
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In the end, using congressional transcripts for the majority of my research lent an
element of authenticity to the information that was presented. Although the members of
Congress were privy to more information behind closed doors, this was a conglomeration
of much of the information Congress had while making decision about how to respond to
the OPM breach.
It was also convenient to use transcripts because I was able to attend many of the

hearings referenced in the text as a part of my internship experience. It was a great
benefit to be able to use information that I had some background with in compiling the
research to complete this task. The research provided a unique and beneficial
complement to my overall internship experience.
The completion of this project has been nearly the only interaction I have had
with the university program. This isolation from the program has been the source of some
confusion about the project, requirements, and timelines . It would have been beneficial to
be more involved with the honors program throughout my time at Utah State in order to
take advantage of the resources they offer.
Although a large portion of the responsibility in completing a capstone or thesis
project falls on the student, there is a compelling incentive for the honors program to try
to help more people through the final capstone process. There are at least a dozen of my
classmates and associates that are clearly honors students and exceptional academics that
have chosen not to complete this project for one reason or another. Not having these
students as a part of the honors network is a disservice not only to them, but also to the
students that do take the requisite steps to graduate with honors . It is my hope that honors
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would seek out and encourage the best minds at Utah State to graduate with honors and
join the alumni base.
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